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Abstract 
The proclivity of military regimes and their leaders for more frequent involvement in 
international conflict than other autocracies has been shown in several studies.  The question 
raised here is not whether they participate in more conflicts and disputes, but rather whether after 
the leaders of military regimes enter office they initiate these acts more quickly than the leaders 
of other types of autocracies.  Drawing on three authoritarian regime typologies and examining 
the time to the initiation of any dispute and the initiation of violent disputes, our results show that 
in comparison to other authoritarian leaders a subset of military leaders is distinctly trigger-
happy. 
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  In December 1981, Leopoldo Galtieri assumed leadership of the junta that in 1976 had 
RYHUWKURZQ$UJHQWLQD¶VSUHVLGHQWIsabel Peron.    Less than four months later Argentina initiated 
its invasion of the Falklands Islands, a dependency of the United Kingdom.  This, of course, 
became the Falklands War, which ended disastrously for Argentina.   While some of the events 
that precipitated the Argentine invasion of the islands may have been out of the hands of Galtieri 
and his colleagues in the junta, there were several points at which they had choices and at each of 
these the path they took involved the use of force.  Given the proclivity for military regimes to 
participate in conflict at a higher rate than other authoritarian regimes²see the discussion 
below²perhaps the Argentine junta¶VPRYHVKRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQDVXUSULVHEXWZKDWLV striking 
about the policy choices is the rapidity with which a new leader engaged his nation in events that 
escalated so quickly.  Was the haste with which Galtieri initiated the conflict an aberration or 
was it part of a pattern in which the leaders of military regimes not only participate 
disproportionately in disputes but also act more quickly than the leaders of other authoritarian 
states? The research reported below is directed at exploring this question.    Our interest in this 
springs from a body of research on the general proclivity of military regimes to participate in 
conflict, a subject to which we now turn. 
Over the past decade a body of evidence has accumulated indicating that among 
authoritarian regimes those controlled by the military are the most belligerent and conflict prone 
when measured by the frequency of their initiation of varying measures of militarized 
international disputes (MIDs) or participation in war.  In a foundational paper Lai and Slater 
(2006) identified four types of authoritarian regimes ± junta, strongman, machine and boss ± the 
first two of which represent variations on military regimes.  Using as their measure of conflict 
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the number of initiations of (1) any MID and (2) violent MIDs, their results clearly support the 
conclusion that military regimes are more belligerent than civilian autocracies.    Subsequently, 
Debs and Goemans (2010), using a set of regime categories originally advanced by Cheibub and 
Gandhi (2004), investigated the propensity for war participation by leaders in royalist, civilian 
and military governments. Their results also are consistent with military regimes being more 
belligerent than civilian autocracies or monarchies.  Most recently, Weeks (2012, 2014), using 
the same government categories as Lai and Slater, but data she coded into the categories, 
identified strongmen (i.e., regimes with individual leaders who have a military background) as 
the most belligerent of authoritarian regimes by their propensity to initiate MIDs, when the 
disputes are aggregated into a dichotomous variable similar to the first MID variable of Lai and 
Slater.3 
To be sure, the literature on autocratic regimes is not unanimous with respect to military 
governments and conflict.  For example, Peceny and Butler (2004) argued that among 
authoritarian regimes it is the personalist strain dominated by a small winning coalition that is 
most responsible for conflict.  More recently, Kim (2014), using many of the same categories as 
the above cited works, reports results that are inconsistent with an observed belligerence on the 
part of military governments.  Those negative results notwithstanding, the evidence for the three 
studies cited above is compelling.  Their results emerge from rigorous analyses and are based on 
three different, albeit related, types of conflict, as the italics above indicate.   
While their results converge, there are subtle differences across these studies.  First, both 
Lai and Slater and Weeks use the state-year as their unit of analysis, while Debs and Goemans 
rely upon the leader-year.  Second, the key theoretical assumptions driving each differ.  Lai and 
                                                          
3 In another analysis Weeks focuses on the effects of defeats in wars (Weeks, 2014: 54-81.) 
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Slater trace the propensity of the military for conflict to diversionary motives that flow from a 
basic inability of military governments to generate the meaningful institutions that would provide 
stability.  Debs and Goemans motivate their research by a set of assumptions about the cost of 
leadership removal and the fate meted out to leaders who are deposed.  The argument set forward 
by Weeks relies on assumptions about the extent to which leaders face institutional constraints 
and attendant audience costs and when those constraints are either weak or absent the effect on 
the preferences of individual leaders.   Hence, military leaders, being versed in the uses of 
violence, when unconstrained are more likely to adopt violent policies.   Although the 
explanations differ, each is plausible and supported by its respective data. 
It is also important to note that these explanations are not mutually exclusive.  For 
H[DPSOH/DLDQG6ODWHU¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWPLOLWDU\OHDGHUVHQJDJHLQFRQIOLFWDVDGLYHUVLRQDU\
ploy does not mean that the same leaders do not fear what will happen to their position if they 
lose a conflict as argued by Debs and Goemans.  Similarly, Weeks assumptions about 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVOLQNZLWK/DLDQG6ODWHU¶VDVVXPSWLRQDERXWWKHODFNRILQVWLWXWLRQVZKLOH
her audience cost issues link with Deb and Goemans¶s assumption on the groups that can remove 
leaders from power. 
The question we address here is whether military regimes are not only more inclined 
toward more frequent conflicts, but whether that inclination carries over to the rapidity with 
which new leaders in military regimes initiate conflict in comparison to other authoritarian 
regimes.  Put simply, are the leaders of military governments trigger-happy?  This is not one of 
the traditional measures of conflict, such as the number of events of a particular type in a year, 
but it is not unprecedented (Ireland and Gartner, 2001).   Importantly, the time it takes a leader to 
initiate the first dispute speaks GLUHFWO\WRDOHDGHU¶VLQFOLQDWLRQWRDJJUHVVLYHQHVV and, depending 
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upon the target, perhaps to risk-taking, as well.  For any leader to militarize a dispute with 
another nation is a serious matter.  The commitment of lives and treasure cannot be dismissed 
lightly, nor can leaders be unmindful of what their fate may be as a consequence of a conflict 
that turns out badly, as shown by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) and Debs and 
Goemans (2010).  Thus focusing on the time to dispute initiation informs us of the 
aggressiveness of a leader.   
It may also tell us something about the effect of the constraints under which leaders make 
decisions.  It is one thing to be aggressive and constrained and it another to be aggressive and 
unconstrained.  The former case would tend to slow the decision-making process in the initiation 
of a dispute since it would presumably encourage deliberation, but the circumstances of the latter 
would be such as to release the leader to act on his preferences to use the military forces of the 
state WRVROYHWKHLVVXH³0LOLWDU\RIILFHUV¶WUDLQLQJOHDGVWKHPWRYLHZWKHXVHRIIRUFHDVD
routine and appropriate policy option, to be wary of diplomacy and to fear the consequences if 
WKH\GRQRWDFW´:HHNV 334).   
We also account for the implications RIHDFKGDWDVHWV¶s assumptions for categorization of 
UHJLPHVZLWKWKHWLPLQJRIGLVSXWHLQLWLDWLRQ,I/DLDQG6ODWHU¶VDVVXPSWLRQRIPLOLWDU\UHJLPHV
engaging in conflict for diversionary purposes is correct then we would not expect a military 
based regime to initiate a conflict quickly.  New leaders ± including military ones ± may have a 
window of opportunity to create or change institutions; thus, they do not need to immediately 
FUHDWHDGLYHUVLRQ6LPLODUO\VXSSRUWIRU'HEVDQG*RHPDQV¶s assumption on the fate of the 
leader driving action would also see leaders as being restrained in action as they would want to 
consolidate their position before initiating.  This would occur with military leaders because they 
do not have other areas of society to fall back onto for support.  In consideration of audience 
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costs LQ:HHNV¶s arguments, the audience for the leader of a military regime is the military and 
not acting out the preferences of that group may have deleterious consequences for the leader.  
The implication is that military leaders will engage in conflict at a faster pace.    
Our consideration of whether the leaders of military governments are quicker to enter 
disputes than other types of regimes is straightforward.  We first discuss the regime typologies 
used in the three studies.  We next report our data, research design and statistical model.  We 
then present a comparative analysis of the ability of the three typologies to capture the speed 
with which new leaders initiate (a) any dispute or (b) one in which reaches the level of violence 
or war, the same types of disputes used by Lai and Slater.  Because capabilities have long been 
the center of research on international conflict we explore their effect on the speed to initiation 
by examining them as a factor that may condition the choices of leaders rather than as a control 
variable, as has usually been the case in the consideration of the domestic political effects of 
regimes. 
Typologies of authoritarian regimes  
   Table 1 contains an enumeration of the categories in three regime typologies discussed 
above, their years covered, the identification of the types each proposes and the number of cases 
in each of their respective category by the leader-spell as drawn from Archigos (Goemans et al. 
2009).4   This is discussed more fully below.  A word of explanation is needed as to why two 
                                                          
4 The regime data we use are organized by national leader-spell.  Hence, if there are two leaders in a state 
in one year, a not unusual event, there will be two cases in that one year.  This will inflate the number of 
cases over what it would be if the regime year was used as the organizing basis of the data, but using the 
leader-year is necessary for the analytic methods used below. By the same token, if a leader is in office 
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typologies using the same categories are included.  Although Weeks (2012) uses the same 
categories as Lai and Slater (2006), for well justified theoretical reasons, different criteria were 
used to assign regimes to categories.  Weeks describes in painstaking detail the steps taken to 
derive the data by drawing on the prior work of Geddes (2003) and Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) 
and then assigning the regimes to the Lai and Slater categories (Weeks, 2012: 336-7; 2014: 179-
183).  Consequently, while the names on the categories are the same, as shown by the tabulated 
numbers in Table 1, the empirical differences between the two, and indeed across all three, are 
significant, a subject to which we now turn. 
---------Table 1 goes here------- 
There are a few points worth noting about the array in Table 1.  First, the granularity of 
the categories is different, with the number of regime categories varying slightly.   Second, there 
is broad nominal agreement on several of the categories.  Every typology recognizes a regime 
dominated by the military, and Weeks and Lai and Slater each have two categories for the 
military: junta and strongman.  One also contains a category for monarchs, but with few cases.   
Third, the total number of autocratic regimes differs significantly across the typologies, ranging 
from 624 (Debs and Goemans) to 299 (Weeks).  It is tempting to think these differences reflect 
variation in the length of the time periods covered.  To some extent this probably  is the case, but 
there is more to it than that, since although Lai and Slater locate 526 leaders of autocratic 
regimes over 42 years,  Weeks identifies 299 over 50 years.   Fourth, there is significant variation 
in the proportion of the regimes across the categories, particularly with respect to the military 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
over several years, the number of observations would be decreased by that number in comparison to an 
analysis based on country-years. 
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UHJLPHV)RUH[DPSOH:HHNV¶MXQWDDQGVWURQJPHQUHSUHVHQWWZRFDWHJRULHVRI military 
governments and are 58.5 per cHQWRIKHUFDVHVZKLOHLQ/DLDQG6ODWHU¶V data the military 
constitutes only 35.2 per cent.    
Not shown in Table 1 is the extent to which the typologies do not agree on where to place 
a particular government in a regime category.  For example, even when using categories of the 
same name, the differing coding criteria of Weeks and Lai and Slater produce a number of 
different assignments across the same nominal categories.  In the time periods in which their data 
overlap, Weeks reports 105 juntas, Lai and Slater report 50, but they agree on only 16.  If you 
combine their respective junta and strongman categories into a single military government type 
the results improve; Weeks identifies 165 military governments, Lai and Slater 185, and they 
agree on 121, but still differ on 92.  A priori a reasonable person might anticipate military 
regimes would be the easiest to identify and agree upon.  Despite the likely prevalence of 
uniforms among government officials, such apparently is not the case.  However, the lack of 
agreement will raise both issues and opportunities in the analysis below. 
Whatever their differences, the typologies described above  will allow an examination of 
the effect of the different types of autocratic regimes on the time it takes leaders after they enter 
office to initiate any militarized interstate dispute (MID) or a dispute minimally involving the use 
of force.    In fact, it is the case that the differences in regime categorization across the three data 
sets may provide insight into how broadly various types of military regimes have an effect on the 
WLPLQJRIDOHDGHU¶VVWDWHHPEDUNLQJRQDSDWKWRFRQIOLFWZLWKDQRWKHUVWDWH Put differently, just 
as there are demonstrated differences across the conflict initiation of different types of autocratic 
regimes, varying characteristics of military regimes may have effects on the calculations and 
behavior of their leaders. 
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 Data and tests 
Using the Archigos data on political leaders (Goemans et al., 2009), we identified all 
leaders of states recognized by the Correlates of War who entered office between 1946 and 1999, 
inclusive.  Using Eugene (Bennett and Stam, 2000), it was then possible to associate each leader 
with their first participation, if any, in any dispute initiation or the initiation of a dispute 
involving the use of force or was a war (i.e., COW hostility levels 4 and 5).  We call the former 
variable Initiate Any Level, based on the COW data set variable DSidea, and the latter Initiate 
Level 4/5.  The categories then are not mutually exclusive, since any dispute in the latter is also 
in the former.  However, below we will explore the utility of treating them as mutually exclusive 
by dividing them into two such groups.  As noted above, similar dispute groupings were used in 
previous research on MIDs by Lai and Slater (2006).  We then recorded the time in days elapsing 
IURPDOHDGHU¶VHQWU\WRRIILFHXQWLOWKHfirst of either of these MID events took place.  We 
consider only the OHDGHUV¶FKRLFHWRLQLWLDWHEHFDXVHLWVSHDNVGLUHFWO\WRWKHLURZQLQFOLQDWLRQWR
engage in conflict.  Over the period 1945-1999, our data record 509 leaders of who initiated a 
first dispute and 329 who initiated a first dispute in which force was used.  After identifying the 
leaders, we assigned each to his (they are almost entirely males) appropriate regime type in the 
three typologies.  To make this clear, because of the differences in regime assignment across the 
typologies ± as discussed above ± Leader X may be assigned to different regime types across the 
categories. 
The standard way to analyze data in which the dependent variable is the elapsed time to 
an event²in this case the initiation of one or the other of the two types of disputes we use²is a 
survival model, where the critical outcome measure is the hazard leaders face at any moment of 
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becoming engaged in one of our two dispute types.5  Importantly, the calculation of the hazard 
includes information on all those who left office without engaging in a dispute as well as those 
still in office in 2002; these observations are censored.  Because of its generality we used 
Weibull regression, but equivalent results are obtained using Cox regression.    
Results  
First, we present the results of examining the time of dispute participation for national 
leaders in the period between 1946 and 1999, using as the independent variables the regime 
categories given in the typologies in Table 1.  Second, we will also consider an alternative 
procedure for assigning leaders and disputes to different categories.  Third, we will assess the 
effects of three control variables on the main results. 
Our initial results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for each of the three categorizations of 
authoritarian leaders with the baseline category being all other states.  In the first table we 
examine the leader choosing to initiate a conflict at any level, and in the second we examine the 
leader choosing to initiate a conflict that involves the use of force or war.  An inspection of the 
results reported in Table 2 makes abundantly evident it is the leaders of military governments 
who initiate disputes more quickly than the other types of autocratic regimes.  In fact, of the in 
11 hazard ratios reported in Table 2, the four statistically significant coefficients associated with 
early entry into disputes are associated with military regimes; only the Lai and Slater Junta 
category fails to be significant.  One speculative explanation for the lack of significance of the 
Junta coefficient is that they are groups of leaders, which implies that discussions may be 
                                                          
5 The hazard ratio is derived from the exponentiation of the coefficient.  We will report both, but the 
hazard ratio has an immediate, intuitively easy to grasp interpretation.  
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necessary before a conflict can be initiated and that these discussions take time for a consensus to 
be reached.  Note that the coefficients and hazard ratios associated with the Strongman 
regimes²presumably based on an individual²are the largest compared to the other significant 
coefficients. 
--------Table 2 goes here------- 
Table 3 reports the results of for those disputes escalating to the use of force or war.   
Once again military governments emerge as the most inclined to become involved in serious 
disputes with all of the statistically significant coefficients being attached to military regimes,  
except, once again, /DLDQG6ODWHU¶V-XQWDAgain the coefficients and hazard ratios for the 
Strongman category are substantial and the largest.   Importantly, although there are discordant 
aspects of the results for the Juntas, none of the non-military categorizations comes close to 
showing an inclination for early entry into either type of dispute that is statistically significant.   
Military regimes stand out for their willingness to act quickly.    
-------Table 3 goes here-------   
 As noted above, there is an aspect of the regime categorizations that is perplexing: the 
lack of agreement across them in terms of who belongs in which category.  That is, the results 
above suggest regimes classified as Juntas are less inclined to enter disputes quickly than the 
Strongmen.  However, recall Weeks and Lai and Slater agree on only 16 cases in which the 
leader is a member of a junta and disagree on 139 other cases.  Since such differences abound 
across all the categorizations, it might be more revealing to examine the effects of military 
regimes and leaders in aggregations where there is sensitivity to the extent to who the 
categorizations include as leaders of military regimes.  To that end, we aggregated the data into 
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two new variables.  In the first, we categorized regimes as military if any one of the typologies 
deemed them as any form of military government.  This yielded leaders of 314 leaders of 
military regimes. We term this Military Any.  We also constructed a variable for military regimes 
if all of the typologies coded them as any type of military regime.  We call this Military All.  
This more restrictive procedure yielded 104 leaders of military governments.  Again, these are 
not mutually exclusive categories, since a regime included in Military All is included in Military 
Any.  These additional categorizations along with others in later analyses are summarized in 
Table 4. Presently, we will consider the effect of separating the categories into exclusive 
categories with the baseline being all leaders not in that category. 
-------Table 4 goes here------- 
Table 5 displays the results of the effects of these aggregations on the inclination of 
leaders to enter disputes.  For each of the four conditions the results are clear: military regimes of 
all sorts are inclined to enter disputes quickly.  Note, too, that the hazard ratios increase from left 
to right across the bottom of the table, so that the most inclined leaders are those in regimes 
where there is no disagreement about the nature of the regime and the dispute involves violence 
at some level. 
-------Table 5 goes here------- 
There is, however, perhaps a problem within this analysis.  Above we noted that both the 
classification of the disputes and military regimes were not mutually exclusive.  Because of this 
the results reported in Table 5, with the strongest effect in the combination of two exclusive 
categories, suggest that perhaps the Military All variable in the Initiate Level 4/5 model are, in 
effect, to some degree driving the results in the other analyses.  This, of course, is easy to check 
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by making the categories mutually exclusive.  Hence, we create Military Not All as a variable 
FRGHGLIWKHOHDGHU¶VUHJLPHLVincluded in Military Any, but not in Military All and 0 otherwise.  
Similarly, we create a variable Initiate Level 1-3, which is coded 1 for all the disputes in Initiate 
Any Level that do not reach the hostility 4 and 5 level ± all other disputes are coded 0. 
 Table 6 shows the results of these changes.  Of the four models, the only results that are 
statistically significant are those in which the disputes reach the level of violence.  The difference 
between these cases and the others is stark, with the lowest significant hazard ratio of 1.38, 
which is almost one and a half times as large as the next largest ratio of 0.92. The results in the 
other three data configurations are either far from statistical significance (i.e., standard error 
either larger than or close to the size of their respective coefficient) or have the wrong sign.  
Before turning to the introduction of control variables we FRQVLGHUWKHUROHRIDVWDWH¶V
capabilities as a factor that might condition this proclivity to initiate violence.  Capability (or 
power) was once the prime analytic tool in the study of international politics, but recent research 
on the internal politics of states has largely relegated it to the status of a control variable.  Since 
violence usually involves what we call power , it may be worth considering the extent to which 
the decision of the military leaders are conditioned on the capabilities of their states, a pattern 
that has been found in other research in which states with higher capability are found to be more 
readily inclined to initiate disputes (Siverson and Johnson, nd).   Does this pattern hold for the 
military regimes?   That is, does variation in the levels of capability available to leaders of 
military regimes incline them to behave in different ways from other leaders?    
-----Table 6 goes here----- 
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To assess this we use the Correlates of War capability data for the year each leader 
entered office.6  Two points about the data used to examine the interaction of capability and 
regime type need explanation.   First, because the COW capabilities data are scaled from 0 to 1, 
the hazard ratios we reported using the raw data would capture the effect of moving from no 
capabilities to having all the capabilities in the system in that year.   To avoid this fanciful 
construction we rescaled the variable by multiplying it by 100.   Because the result was skewed 
we added 1 and took its log. 
-----Table 7 goes here----- 
   Table 7 displays the result of the interactions between regime type and capabilities for 
the specifications used in the mutually exclusive variables shown in Table 6.   Because 
interactions cannot be interpreted directly (Brambor et al., 2006), a clearer understanding of what 
is going on may be seen in the graphs of the predicted margins shown in Figures 1 and 2.  What 
is strikingly clear in all of these is that adding capabilities to the analyses adds little or nothing to 
the results for any of the specifications except for the right-hand panel in Figure 2, which is, once 
again, the case of those who were identified by all the data sets as leaders of military regimes and 
who initiate disputes that become violent.  In the other three other graphs there is either no result 
or differences so small the 95 per cent confidence intervals overlap.  The last graph, however, 
shows a sharp difference between the more exclusive type of military regime and hostility.7    
                                                          
6 It would have been inadvisable to use the year of the dispute or the year before a dispute, because, of 
course, not all leaders initiated a dispute; hence it is not clear which data should be entered for them. 
7 Since the result of this interaction is not significant, there might be an objection to its consideration.  
However, as Brambor et al, (2006: SRLQWRXW³LWLVSHUIHFWO\SRVVLEOHIRUWKHPDUJLQDOHIIHFWRI;RQ<
16 
 
While the right-hand panel of Figure 2 shows capability having an effect on both the 
military regimes and all the other states, the effect is far less pronounced for the military regimes 
identified by all the studies.  Put simply, while capability makes a difference of all the regimes²
that is, as capability increases, time to dispute goes down²the effect of capabilities on the 
military regimes is significantly less than on the others.   The leaders of these governments 
appear to enter disputes more rapidly than other regimes even when their capabilities are 
relatively modest.  Given that these were disputes involving violence, the inclination for being 
trigger-happy is unmistakable. 
 But are there other factors whose effects we need to consider as possible elements leading 
to a spurious relationship?    Three elements stand out.  First, states engaged in a lengthy series 
of disputes with another state²what are termed rivalries (Thompson, 2001)²may be more 
inclined to have military governments because of the need to mobilize their population.  We 
LQFOXGHDGXPP\YDULDEOHFRGHGLIWKHOHDGHU¶VILUVWGLVSXWHZDVZLWKa rival and 0 otherwise.  
Second, alliances can have some of the same effects as capabilities on the calculations leaders 
make about conflict.  For each state we sum the number of defense alliances in place when the 
leader enters office.  Because the data are skewed we take their log plus one.   Third, some states 
are located in a ³EDGQHLJKERUKRRG´LQZKLFKWKHFRORFDWLRQRIERWKGLVSXWHVDQGPLOLWDU\
governments may be driving the results.  We consider this possibility by including dummy 
variables for each of the geographic areas given in the COW listing, but omitting North America 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to be significant for substantively relevant values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on 
the interaction term is insignificant. Note what this means. It means that one cannot determine whether a 
model should include an interaction term simply by looking at the significance of the coefficient on the 
LQWHUDFWLRQWHUP´ 
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(Singer and Small, 1972).  We also control for the number of borders a state has (Gibler and Tir, 
2010). 
 The results are shown in Table 8.  The results for the regime type and capabilities are not 
greatly different from those in Table 7 and like the previous result the coefficient for interaction 
is not statistically significant.  Statistically significant results are shown for the alliance and 
rivalries.  The regional dummy for the Middle East is statistically significant but none of the 
other regional variables are meaningful. 
-------Table 8 goes here------- 
 The impact of these new variables is shown in Figure 3, where pattern previously shown 
in Figure 2b remains in place, but with one noticeable difference: the gap between the two types 
of leaders closes at higher levels of capabilities before separating when states have a capability 
lower than 1.25.  Removing the regional dummies has no effect on these results. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above, there are some points worthy of brief discussion.  First, from 
the rapidity with which the military regimes initiated violent disputes it is apparent there was 
relatively little in the way of constraints on the choices of their leaders that led to violent 
disputes.  An examination of the cases in which there was this rapid inclination to violence 
shows that the regimes in place are fairly evenly divided between juntas and strongmen, a pattern 
at slight variance with the results Weeks reports on the frequency of the initiation of all disputes 
where strongmen are generally the most belligerent (Weeks, 2014, Table 2: 44-5).   If one argues 
that strongmen are the most belligerent because they have fewer constraints, then the behavior of 
the juntas seems incongruous.  Juntas are by definition groups, and it is reasonable to infer that a 
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group will need more time to make a decision than a single individual.  That said, there no reason 
WREHOLHYHWKDWMXQWDVDUHQHFHVVDULO\LPPXQHWRZKDWKDVEHHQWHUPHG³JURXSWKLQN´-DQLV
1972), particularly when the members of the group all share the views typically attributed to the 
military about the use of force.  In such a case a speedy course of action could easily be 
undertaken. 
Second, it is unfortunate there is not more agreement on regime classifications across the 
three studies on which we drew.  As we noted above, it is somewhat distressing that agreement 
on juntas, presumably the easiest to identify because of their group character, was so low.  
Unfortunately, most governments do not label themselves for us and those who do so are usually 
JXLOW\RIPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQHJ³7KH3HRSOH¶V'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRIBBBBBBB+ence, it is 
necessary for those who are interested in governmental types to make decisions, not all of which 
are clear cut.  For example, some of the differences across the data sets may be due to ex post 
coding; that is, what starts out as a junta may become a strongman as one leader either eliminates 
others or reduces their influence to an exiguous level.  If the assignments of regime type focus on 
the regime at different points in time, variation in category assignment may occur.  That said, it 
is to the credit of the reported research that the data are easily available and those wishing to use 
it can readily determine the extent to which it is useful and appropriate for their purposes.    
 Finally, it is clear from our analysis that the leaders of the most clearly identified 
military regimes, even those with low capability, which is most of them, are indeed trigger-
happy and are not only quick to initiate a dispute but to do so in a situation that becomes violent.  
Unlike the leaders of other low capability states that are either slow to initiate a dispute or do not 
do so before the leader leaves office, the leaders of the military regimes are unusually forceful in 
their choices. 
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 If this seems pessimistic, we can end on a positive note.  Military regimes and their 
leaders have always been in a minority of contemporary regimes.  For their type they are 
unusually involved in international disputes, but these disputes are not large in their number 
becDXVHWKHQXPEHURIWKHVHUHJLPHVLVQRWODUJH,QIDFWDFFRUGLQJWR:LNLSHGLD¶VUHJLPH
identifications there is only one military regime in place at the time of this writing.8  We may 
hope that the decrease in their number will make the world a safer place, even if it is a small 
degree. 
 
  
                                                          
8 No points for guessing Thailand. 
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Table 1: Regime Typologies, Years Covered and Categories 
        
Author(s)  
Debs and Goemans 
(2010) 
Weeks (2012) Lai and Slater (2006) 
Time coverage 1946-1996 1949-1999 1950-1992 
Categories (N)  
Civilian Dictatorship 
(335) 
Strongman (69) Strongman (135) 
 
Military Dictatorship 
(252) 
Junta (106) Junta (50) 
 
Royal Dictatorship (37) Machine (73) Machine (266) 
  
Boss (51) Boss (75) 
    Total 
Autocracies 
624 299 526 
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Table 2: Duration Model Results for Initiation of Any Level of MID 
                              
  DG       Weeks         Lai and Slater       
  Military Civilian Monarch Constant Junta Strongman Machine Boss Constant Junta Strongman Machine Boss Constant 
Coef. 0.37** 0.09 -0.15 -6.05** 0.58** 0.50** 0.18 -0.18 -6.06** 0.21 0.60** 0.21 -0.04 -6.09** 
S.E. (0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.25) (0.23) (0.27) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.25) 
H.R. 1.44 1.10 0.86 
 
1.78 1.64 1.20 0.83 
 
1.24 1.82 1.24 0.96 
 
                              
Chi^2 9.83    18.60     14.69     
N 1673 
   
1476 
    
981 
    
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
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Table 3: Duration Model Results for Initiation of MID with Use of Force or War 
                              
  DG       Weeks         Lai and Slater       
  Military Civilian Monarch Constant Junta Strongman Machine Boss Constant Junta Strongman Machine Boss Constant 
Coef. 0.69** 0.20 -0.23 -6.30** 0.81* 0.70** 0.12 0.05 -6.23** 0.55 0.86** 0.32 0.08 -6.22** 
S.E. (0.14) (0.14) (0.34) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.23) (0.30) (0.19) (0.18) (0.34) (0.28) 
H.R. 2.00 1.22 0.80 
 
2.24 2.02 1.13 1.05 
 
1.73 2.37 1.38 1.08 
 
                              
Chi^2 24.65    24.36     21.66     
N 1673 
   
1476 
    
981 
    
** p < 0.01;  
* p < 0.05              
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Table 4: Description of Independent Variables Categorizing Military Leaders and Failure 
Variables Determining the Time Until Conflict 
 
   
Variable Description Role 
Military Any Leader coded as being military in at least 
one categorization, including all 
categorizations. 
Independent variable. 
Military All Leader coded as being military in all of the 
categorizations. 
Independent variable. 
Military Not All Leader coded as being military in at least 
one categorization, but not all 
categorizations.  
Independent variable. 
Initiate Any Level Leader initiated a MID of any level during 
their tenure. 
Failure variable. 
Initiate Level 1-3 Leader initiated a MID at level 1, 2, or 3 
during their tenure.  These are conflicts that 
do not become violent. 
Failure variable. 
Initiate Level 4/5 Leader initiated a MID at level 4 or 5 during 
their tenure.  These are conflicts involving 
the use of force or war. 
Failure variable. 
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Table 5: Duration Model Results for Leaders Categorized as Military in Any Typology and as 
Military in All Typologies 
     
     
  
Initiate 
Any Level 
Initiate 
Any Level 
Initiate 
Level 4/5 
Initiate 
Level 4/5 
Military Any 0.36** 
 
0.64** 
 
S.E. (0.11)  (0.12)  
H.R. 1.44  1.90  
Military All  0.59**  0.85** 
S.E.  (0.14)  (0.16) 
H.R.  1.80  2.33 
Constant -6.10** -6.07** -6.34** -6.26** 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) 
  
    
Chi^2 10.58 14.94 23.93 23.06 
N 1710 1710 1710 1710 
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
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Table 6: Duration Model Results for Leaders Categorized as Military in Fewer than All 
Typologies and as Military in All Typologies 
     
 
Initiate 
Level 1-3 
Initiate 
Level 1-3 
Initiate  
Level 4/5 
Initiate 
Level 4/5 
Military Not All -0.47  0.32*  
S.E. (0.31)  (0.17)  
H.R. 0.62  1.38  
Military All  -0.09  0.85** 
S.E.  (0.31)  (0.16) 
H.R.  0.92  2.33 
     
Constant -7.58** -7.62** -6.25** -6.26** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.22) (0.22) 
     Chi^2 2.68 0.08 3.55 23.06 
N 1710 1710 1710 1710 
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
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Table 7: Duration Model Results for Leaders Categorized as Military in Fewer than All 
Typologies and as Military in All Typologies 
        
Initiate Level 1-3        
 Military 
Not All 
Capability Mil Not 
All*Cap 
 Military 
All 
Capability Mil 
All*Cap 
Coef. -0.28 0.94** -0.20  -0.10 0.94** 0.64 
S.E. (0.35) (0.11) (0.60)  (0.41) (0.11) (0.96) 
H.R. 0.75 2.55 0.82  0.91 2.55 1.90 
        
Constant -8.38**    -8.42**   
 (0.38)    (0.38)   
Chi^2 55.86    54.86   
Initiate Level 4/5        
 Military 
Not All 
Capability Mil Not 
All*Cap 
 Military 
All 
Capability Mil 
All*Cap 
Coef. 0.42 0.82** 0.04  0.85** 0.85** 0.46 
S.E. (0.19) (0.08) (0.28)  (0.21) (0.08) (0.49) 
H.R. 1.52 2.28 1.04  2.35 2.33 1.59 
        
Constant -6.88**    -6.92**   
 (0.25)    (0.25)   
Chi^2 78.23    101.71   
        
N 1667    1667   
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05       
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Table 8: Duration Model Results for Military All at Hostility Level 4/5 with Controls 
    
 Coefficient Std. Error Hazard 
Military All 0.57** (0.23) 1.76 
Capabilities 0.50** (0.11) 1.65 
Military All* 
Capabilities 
0.42 (0.56) 1.52 
Number Alliances 0.09 (0.06) 1.09 
Number Borders 0.05* (0.03) 1.05 
Rival 1.50** (0.14) 4.46 
Asia 0.48 (0.29) 1.61 
Middle East 0.95** (0.24) 2.59 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.26 (0.29) 0.77 
Europe -0.04 (0.25) 0.96 
South America -0.08 (0.26) 0.93 
Constant -7.88** (0.36)  
Chi^2 293.30   
N 1565   
  
  
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05    
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Figure 1: Predicted Time to Conflict for Military Leaders at Initiate Level 1-3 
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Figure 2: Predicted Time to Conflict for Military Leaders at Initiate Hostility Level 4/5 
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Figure 3: Predicted Time to Conflict for Military Leaders at Initiate Hostility Level 4/5 with 
Controls 
 
